The case against Thyspunt

The evidence is already in writing. Most of it comes from Eskom’s own specialists.

The Thyspunt Alliance does not ask you to take our word for anything. Every claim is sourced from official documents — EIA scoping reports, specialist appendices, government gazettes, and independent scientific studies. This page is where we show our working.

Six reasons. All evidenced. All on the record

01 — The visual impact is rated HIGH. Eskom’s own specialist said so.

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Eskom’s visual specialist assessed the proposed facility and rated its impact HIGH — with no effective mitigation possible. Reactor buildings, cooling towers and transmission infrastructure of this scale cannot be screened or concealed. The finding is in the official DSR. St Francis Bay’s economy, property values and tourism market all depend on this coastline’s character. That character would change permanently.


VISUAL IMPACT — APPENDIX G15

“The visual impact of the proposed development is rated HIGH. No effective mitigations exist for a nuclear power facility of this scale in a coastal landscape.”

Eskom’s own visual specialist, DSR 2026

02 — The surf breaks could be permanently damaged.

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6.4 million cubic metres of excavation. 4.5 million cubic metres dumped in the ocean. Eskom’s 2026 report uses the word ‘irreversible’ to describe the potential long-term impact on surf breaks. At Bantamsklip — the alternative site — the same report rates the surf break impact Very Low with High confidence. Thyspunt: Medium with only Moderate confidence. The site comparison table omits this differential entirely.  
SURF BREAKS — APPENDIX G13

“Disposal of large quantities of material may have an irreversible impact on surf breaks in the long-term.”

Eskom’s marine specialist, DSR 2026

03 — The marine ecology impact is Very High. The science is incomplete.

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The chokka squid fishery is one of South Africa’s most significant inshore fisheries. The cooling system draws 76,000 litres per second per reactor unit through critical spawning habitat. Eskom’s marine report rates the impact Very High before mitigation — and has not modelled this at the full 5,200 MW scale. No independent peer review has been conducted for the Thyspunt-specific marine studies.  
MARINE ECOLOGY — APPENDIX G12

“Impacts of particular concern are identified. The marine assessment does not reflect the full 5,200 MW operational scale.”

Eskom’s marine ecology specialist, DSR 2026

04 — This is a Grade I Cultural Landscape. The highest protection in South African law.

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January 2025: SAHRA declared the Thyspunt site a Grade I Cultural Landscape — equivalent to Robben Island. The coastline contains 160,000 years of archaeological history. The DSR does not address what this means for the project, does not clarify the Section 28 permit requirement, and does not explain how a nuclear facility is compatible with Grade I protection.  
HERITAGE — SAHRA GAZETTE NO. 52013

“The provisional Grade I Cultural Landscape declaration covers the Thyspunt development footprint. Lapses 1 February 2027.”

SAHRA, January 2025

05 — You cannot build permanent infrastructure in a moving dunefield.

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The Oyster Bay dunefield moves 10 to 30 metres per year. Eskom’s own geomorphologists call it unique on a local, regional and probably global scale. A nuclear power station requires fixed infrastructure for 60+ years. The EIA has not established that permanent nuclear infrastructure can coexist with a system that has been migrating continuously for thousands of years. The dunefield sits above a sensitive, interconnected double-aquifer groundwater system. Two boreholes across 250 hectares is not adequate baseline data.  
DUNE GEOMORPHOLOGY — APPENDIX G01

“The headland-bypass dunefields at Cape St Francis are unique on a local, regional and probably global scale. Dunes move at 10 to 30 metres per year.”

Eskom’s dune geomorphology specialist, DSR 2026

06 — The legal foundation of this EIA may not be valid.

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The ministerial determination authorising nuclear procurement was withdrawn in August 2024 after a legal challenge found the public participation process deficient. No valid replacement has been confirmed. Without a Section 34 determination, neither the 5,200 MW quantum nor Eskom’s role as procurer has confirmed statutory foundation. The Kromme Enviro-Trust has formally requested confirmation of the legal basis on which this EIA is proceeding.  
Legal reference: Section 34(1) Electricity Regulation Act · Earthlife Africa v Minister of Energy (2017) · Kromme Enviro-Trust primary submission, 30 April 2026

The numbers that don’t appear in Eskom’s public meetings.

South Africa doesn’t have an unlimited electricity budget. What we spend at Thyspunt is money we cannot spend on solar, wind and storage. These are the figures.

Nuclear at Thyspunt — 5,200 MW

  • Capital cost: R550 billion – R1,100 billion+ (overnight, excluding financing)
  • LCOE: $141–$220 per MWh (Lazard 2025) · ≈R2.50–R4.00/kWh
  • First power: ≈ 2038–2041 at best
  • Construction: 12–15 years
  • Decommissioning liability: R100–R200 billion+
  • Risk: Entirely borne by South African taxpayers

Renewables + storage — 5,200 MW firm supply

  • Capital cost: R180–R250 billion (phased, includes storage)
  • LCOE: $45–$95 per MWh (Lazard 2025) · ≈R0.80–R1.70/kWh
  • First power: 18–24 months, built in phases
  • Construction: 2–3 years per phase
  • Decommissioning: No radioactive waste. Land rehabilitable.
  • Risk: Significantly lower. Private IPP finance.

Sources: Lazard Levelised Cost of Energy+ v18.0 (2025) · IRENA 2025 · BloombergNEF 2024 · NTCSA Transmission Development Plan 2024 · CSIR 2024.